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Onboard Oxygen
Generating System
(OBOGS)
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OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS:

Started with VFA-106 MISHAP (April 2001)

- No clear determination of cause
 - Hypoxia considered a contributor
- During validation of new Leak Adapter and draft procedures (IMP IA.4) in December 01, AOS Team uncovered massive leaks in F/A-18C/D and F-14D 02 delivery system.
 - 3 of 4 F/A-18 aircraft
 - 1 F-14D
 - Additional aircraft confirmed during FITWING check



- COMFITWINGLANT and COMSTRKFITWINGLANT directed squadrons to perform a torque verification check to correct immediate (massive) leaks. That was followed up with a formal AFB (500).
- Inventory of available SE (74D470010-1001) to perform platform leak checks indicated an acute shortage (in cal, insufficient assets etc.)
- Basis for decision to field new OBOGS Leak Adapter Kit (3248AS 300-1)







OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS (continued):

- AOS Team assembled and PMA-241/ PMA-265 delivered to F-14D and F/A-18 platform managers 166 Leak Adapter Kits.
 Additionally, PMA-265 procured and delivered nitrogen bottle/cart
 To F/A-18 squadrons/facilities to support test requirement.
- Platform pubs updated to reflect new leak check procedures and SE.

Meanwhile:

- Hypoxia incidents continued to be reported.
- AOS Team received over 20 reports of Hypoxia and accompanying Engineering Investigations.



- AOS Team , in addition to standard EI procedures , increased the scope of testing of components to testing as an operating system at altitude. Initially conducted at MFG Depot, (Northrop Grumman LS), NAVAIR/NAWCAD developed the ability to perform these altitude tests in-house.
 - 2 altitude chambers
 - Concentrator operating @ aircraft altitude
 - Cockpit enclosed equipment (SSOM, Crewmember,
 O2 Regulator etc.) @ cabin altitude





















- EI's have confirmed no failures of OBOGS equipment, or that it has been a contributor to the reported Hypoxia.
- What Has been found (Hardware).
 - Leaking oxygen product lines
 - Defective Secondary Bleed Air Pressure Regulating and Shut-off Valves
 - ECS Controller
 - O2 Hose Console Quick Disconnect
 - Aircraft w/History of ECS problems





- · What has been found (Human Factors).
 - Aircrew unfamiliar with function of equipment
 - CDR Harm Rabb Factor
 - Pre Flight procedures not being performed
 - Warnings being disregarded
- What was done to mitigate:
 - PMA-202 Message released Pt 1 and Pt2 (050943Z Mar 02 and 051043Z Mar 02) providing detailed OBOGS SITSUM.





- What was done to mitigate:
 - A NAVAIR Tiger Team was established that conducted training and familiarization of the abilities, limitations, care and feeding of OBOGS (aircrew and maintainers) at all CONUS USN/USMC Air Stations supporting OBOGS.





OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS (continued):

- · Results:
 - Expanding of testing requirements
 - NAVAIR Tiger Team Visits
 - Recognition by all of the interdependency of OBOGS and the supporting ECS system

Have Greatly Reduced the reported Hypoxia Incidents.

But!!!!





- The AOS Team was STILL not satisfied that we had investigated everything that could have caused the reported hypoxia.
- The next step was to verify the quality of OBOGS product Crewmember is receiving.
- OBOGS Source and Product Air samples were obtained from F/A-18 C/D Aircraft@ NAS Oceana VA



OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS (continued):

- 3 Aircraft (Lot 13, Lot 19 and an F/A-18D)
- 3 sample locations per aircraft:

OBOGS Source Air Inlet (ECS)

OBOGS Concentrator Outlet (Product)

Oxygen Regulator Inlet (Crewmember)


2 power settings

Idle

80%











OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS (continued):

2 Crewmember Configurations

Mask On

Mask Off

Total samples:

12 samples F/A-18D (VFA-106)

12 samples F/A-18C (VFA-131)

06 samples F/A-18C (VFA-34)























OBOGS HYPOXIA REPORTS (continued):

• Those gas samples were analyzed @ AIMD NAS Oceana VA using the ABO Analyzer.

Conclusions:

- OBOGS Concentrator is removing contaminants to an acceptable level for aircrew consumption.
- With mask off, crewmember is breathing ECS air with an unacceptable level of contaminants and will negatively affect the performance and product of the concentrator and crewmember.



BACKGROUND (Initial HRI = 10):

• HOSE FAILURES RESULT IN
UNRESTRICTED LOX FLOW INTO COCKPIT
INJURING AIRCREW DUE TO LOW
TEMPERATURE BURNS. HOSE FAILURES
RESULT IN REDUCED OXYGEN FLOW TO
THE CREWMEMBER CAUSING THE
POTENTIAL FOR HYPOXIA





• Action Taken:

- Conducted In house Engineering investigations on failed oxygen hoses as submitted by fleet.
- Conducted on-site investigation @ NAS Oceana with support from COMSTRIKEFIGHTWINGLANT
- Independent investigation conducted by Hydraflow on 6 hoses from VMFAT-101





Results of investigations:

- Failures occurred due to stress and age
- Contributing factor:
 - Severe bend when Regulator Hose is connected to Survival Kit Hose while wearing SV-2
 - No defined Check and Test procedures or service life
 - Unacceptable twisting of hoses created during hook-up







Results of investigations: (continued)

- Impact while crewmember is wearing AIRSAVE Vest was also evaluated
- Ability to adjust Regulator location eliminated the severe bend.





Corrective Actions to Date:

- To track periodic check/test and life limits, serialization of hoses had to be established.
- Message (DTG 161259Z DEC 03) implemented and defined hose serialization requirements
- Specific Check and Test procedures for Regulator Hose have been written and distributed (NAVAIR 13-1-6.4-1 Chapter 15, CD-ROM Date Jan 04, available to fleet on NATEC Website March



- Survival Kit Hose procedures are in development
- Oxygen Hose (Survival Kit and Regulator) Life limit being defined. Impact to fleet has been evaluated and phased implementation needs to be defined to prevent adverse fleet impact.
- In response to VFA-83 HAZREP (DTG 122223 Dec 03) specific Regulator hose B-Nut torque has been defined for OBOGS Hose. Specific regulator hose orientation has also been established. To minimize/eliminate hose twisting during hook-up.
- IRAC to NAVAIR 13-1-6.7-3 being developed.





Questions?

